Locational Marginal Pricing of Natural Gas subject to Engineering Constraints by Rudkevich, Alex & Zlotnik, Anatoly
Locational Marginal Pricing of Natural Gas subject to Engineering Constraints
Aleksandr M. Rudkevich
Newton Energy Group
Tabors Caramanis Rudkevich
Boston, MA
arudkevich@negll.com
Anatoly Zlotnik
Theoretical Division
Los Alamos National Laboratory
Los Alamos, NM
azlotnik@lanl.gov
Abstract
We derive a price formation mechanism to maximize
social welfare for a pipeline network that delivers natural
gas from suppliers to consumers. The system is modeled as
a metric graph subject to physical balance laws for steady-
state hydraulic flow on edges and mass balance at nodes.
The pricing mechanism incorporates engineering constraints
on local pressures and energy applied by gas compres-
sors. Optimality conditions yield expressions for locational
marginal prices for gas (gLMPs) and a decomposition of
gLMPs into components corresponding to energy, compres-
sion, and two types of congestion. We demonstrate that price
and pressure differentials between nodes have the opposite
sign, so that price cannot decline in the direction of flow, and
prove that the pricing mechanism is revenue adequate. We
also present computational examples of congestion pricing
for a small test network and a large-scale case study.
I. INTRODUCTION
Significant growth in the use of natural gas for power gen-
eration in the United States is causing growing demand for
transportation of gas through large-scale interstate pipelines
[1]. This trend has been driven by environmental regulations,
a push towards cleaner electric power sources, abundant
supplies of inexpensive natural gas, and improvements in
gas turbine efficiency [2]. Retiring coal-fired and nuclear
power plants continue to be replaced primarily by gas-fired
units [3]. Because power production by gas turbines is highly
maneuverable, gas-fired generators are best able to balance
fluctuations caused by variable and non-dispatched gener-
ation such as wind and solar [4]. Concurrently, increased
reliance on gas-fired generation transfers the energy demand
onto natural gas pipeline infrastructure [5], [6].
Current market structures for interstate pipeline trans-
portation services in the United States are constrained within
a regulatory framework that was not designed for responsive
price formation [7]. Access to pipeline capacity is provided
at rates regulated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Com-
mission (FERC). Holders of firm physical rights are allowed
to sell unneeded capacity on a daily basis through a release
mechanism. Released capacity is bundled with gas supply
and traded bilaterally in a locational spot market for natural
gas. Trading platforms such as the Intercontinental Exchange
(ICE) serve as major vehicles for price formation. Reported
price indices for several dozen locations in North America
change daily with Friday prices prevailing over the weekend.
These daily prices fail to reflect intra-day demand variations.
Historically, intra-day demand variations were primarily
caused by changes in residential and commercial loads.
These changes are typically weather driven, predictable, and
reasonably well managed by pipeline operators. In contrast,
significant intra-day and even sub-hourly swings in demand
for natural gas as a fuel for electric generation create new
challenges for pipeline operators, and pose reliability risks
for gas pipelines and electric systems. The need to better
coordinate the two sectors to mitigate these risks is well
recognized [8], [3], [9], and is reflected in two recent FERC
orders [10], [11]. Coordination mechanisms proposed to date
are based on widening the scope of operational information
exchanged by the two sectors and on adjusting the timing
of when these exchanges occur. While these measures are
helpful, it is also necessary to create economic tools for
gas-electric coordination that provide incentives for market
participants to change behavior in a way that would result in
more efficient and reliable operation of both infrastructures.
Intra-day locational prices of natural gas that are consistent
with the physics and engineering constraints of pipeline
operation could provide such a tool.
In the electric power industry, the use of optimization
to price electricity based on the physical ability of the
electric network to deliver it from producers to consumers is
standard practice [12], [13]. In contrast, with the exception
of the market in the Australian province of Victoria [14],
the use of physics-based optimization to clear natural gas
markets remains a topic of research [15], [16]. Developing
locational pricing mechanisms for natural gas is challenging
because of complex physical and engineering factors of
pipeline hydraulic modeling and optimization [17], [18].
Thus in addition to the different physical and operational
aspects of gas pipelines and electric power grids, there is also
a disparity in market mechanisms that complicates attempts
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to bridge the gap in coordination between these sectors [19].
Interest in developing auction-based pricing mechanisms
for pipeline capacity that are similar to what is used in
wholesale electricity markets goes back nearly 30 years,
as evidenced by the 1987 FERC report [20]. In that re-
port, a linear programming model for auctioning pipeline
transportation rights was proposed, with primary auctions
to be conducted as often as daily. More frequent secondary
auctions for re-selling of capacity rights were envisioned as
well. Many of the ideas in the 1987 proposal remain relevant
and deserve to be re-examined in light of noted trends in
the natural gas industry, improved optimization techniques,
and the significant experience gained through successful
implementation of auction-based market mechanisms over
the past two decades in the power industry worldwide.
In this paper, we begin a study of the properties of
locational marginal prices of natural gas (gLMPs) based
on the single price auction mechanism and the physics
of natural gas flows in pipeline networks. In contrast to
previous studies [14], [21], we do not linearize gas flow
equations and thus retain the impact of non-linearities on
price formation. Our use of nonlinear models is justified by
recent advances in computing technology and optimization
methods [22], [18]. The results presented in this paper
are limited to formulations for steady-state flow, and show
promise for extension to dynamic price models that capture
the effect of flow transients and line pack. We adopt an en-
gineering approach developed for large-scale control system
modeling of gas pipelines [23], [24], so that constraints on
flow and energy usage by compressors can be described. An
optimization formulation that maximizes social welfare is
presented in which variable transportation costs are factored
into the pricing mechanism. While marginal pricing and
economic spot markets for gas have been studied [25], the
gLMPs derived here provide price signals that reflect the
physical ability to transport gas through a pipeline system.
We present an engineering economic analysis of price dif-
ferentials created through the proposed market mechanism,
and prove revenue adequacy for the market administrator.
The rest of the manuscript is structured as follows. In
Section II, we describe the engineering model that we
use to represent a gas pipeline network under steady-state
flow conditions. Section III follows with the derivation of
the maximum social welfare optimization problem, and a
derivation of the optimality conditions. In Section IV, we
derive expressions for locational marginal gas prices, and
prove revenue adequacy in Section V. We then present and
interpret two computational examples in Section VI, and
conclude with a discussion of promising directions in VII.
II. ENGINEERING MODEL OF A GAS PIPELINE
NETWORK UNDER STEADY-STATE FLOW CONDITIONS
We represent a gas pipeline network as a metric graph
Γ = (V ,E ,B) where V is the set of vertices (or nodes)
and E ⊂ V ×V is the set of directed edges (i, j) ∈ E that
connect the nodes i, j ∈ V . Every edge (i, j) ∈ E is associ-
ated with a resistance term βi j = B(i, j) given by the map
B :E→R+, where R+ = {x ∈R : x≥ 0}. This map defines
the graph edge metric that quantifies physical resistance to
flow through each pipe. We let V = |V | and E = |E | denote
the number of nodes and of edges, respectively. In addition
to network nodes, we introduce the set G of gNodes, which
enumerate the notional receipt or delivery points associated
with network nodes in V . Each supplier is considered to
be injecting gas at a unique gNode, and each off-taker
withdraws gas at a unique gNode. Each gNode k ∈ G can
represent only one supplier or off-taker, and is associated
with a unique network node j(k) ∈ V . The incoming and
outgoing neighborhoods of a node j ∈ V , and the set of
gNodes connected to j ∈ V , are respectively denoted by
∂+ j =
{
i ∈ V | (i, j) ∈ E}⊂ V , (1)
∂− j =
{
k ∈ V | ( j,k) ∈ E}⊂ V , (2)
∂g j =
{
k ∈ G | j(k) ∈ V }⊂ G . (3)
In steady flow, the system can be characterized by pres-
sures p j at each node j ∈ V , or by flow φi j on each edge
(i, j) ∈ E and pressure at one node (e.g. a “slack” node)
i ∈ V . In addition, every node in V is associated with a
boundary condition, which is either a fixed pressure (if it
is a slack node), or the total mass flow injection q j (for all
other non-slack nodes). This mass injection is equal to the
supply minus the consumption at that node, as expressed by
q j = ∑
k∈∂g j
(sk−dk). (4)
The balance of incoming and outgoing physical mass flows
and injection of gas into the network must be preserved for
each network node j ∈ V . This is expressed as a constraint
for all non-slack nodes by
∑
i∈∂+ j
φi j− ∑
k∈∂− j
φ
jk
=− ∑
k∈∂g j
(sk−dk), ∀ j ∈ V . (5)
The pressure of gas flowing through the system is boosted
by compressor stations, or compressors for short. In our
model, these compressors are located at the interfaces be-
tween nodes and adjoining pipes. Each is able to boost
flow going from a node into an adjoining pipe. We define
two sets of these compressors, C ⊂ E and C ⊂ E , where
(i, j)∈ C denotes a compressor located near node i∈V that
boosts flow into edge (i, j) ∈ E in the positive direction,
while (i, j) ∈ C denotes a compressor located near node
j ∈ V that boosts flow into edge (i, j) ∈ E in the negative
direction. Compression is then modeled as a multiplicative
ratio αi j ∈ R+ for (i, j) ∈ C and αi j ∈ R+ for (i, j) ∈ C .
Each compression ratio provides a relation between nodal
pressure at compressor suction and pipe boundary pressure
at compressor discharge. Thus, the suction pressure p j of a
compressor ( j,k) for k ∈ ∂− j is related to the pipe boundary
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pressure p jk at the j end of pipe ( j,k) by
p jk = α jk p j, ∀( j,k) ∈ E . (6)
Similarly, the suction pressure of a compressor (i, j) for i ∈
∂+ j is related to the pipe boundary pressure pi j at the j end
of pipe (i, j) by
pi j = αi j p j, ∀(i, j) ∈ E . (7)
These pressure variables are illustrated in Figure 1. We
assume that compressor stations are designed and operated
only to boost pressure, so that αi j,αi j ≥ 1.
Without loss of generality, we can assume that each
compressor can be powered by burning a portion of gas
flowing through it, or by using an equivalent amount of
electric energy in a known proportion that is specific for each
compressor. The energy consumption rates of compressors
powered by gas are then approximated by
E i j = ηi j|φi j|
(
(α2mi j )−1
)
, (i, j) ∈ C , (8)
E i j = ηi j|φi j|
(
(α2mi j )−1
)
, (i, j) ∈ C , (9)
with 0 < m = (γg−1)/γg < 1 where γg is the heat capacity
ratio of the gas [17]. With the appropriate constants ηi j and
ηi j, the energy consumption rates (8)-(9) can be expressed
in the same units of mass flow rate as φi j to reflect the gas
consumed as fuel for compression.
The differences between discharge flow and suction flow
of compressors powered by gas are given by (8)-(9). For
each compressor, we introduce the parameter ε ∈ {0,1},
where ε = 1 when the compressor is powered by gas and
ε= 0 indicates that the compressor is powered by electricity.
Under this assumption, the suction flow φ
jk
of a compressor
( j,k) for k ∈ ∂− j (flow entering the compressor ( j,k) from
node j) is related to the discharge flow φ jk (which is uniform
along pipe ( j,k)) according to
φ jk = φ jk− ε jkE jk, ∀( j,k) ∈ E . (10)
Similarly, the suction flow φi j of a compressor (i, j) for i ∈
∂+ j (flow entering the compressor (i, j) from node j) is
related to the discharge flow φi j (which is uniform along
pipe (i, j)) according to
φi j = φi j + ε jkE i j, ∀(i, j) ∈ E . (11)
These flow variables are illustrated in Figure 1.
We model the relationship between flow and boundary
pressures in a pipe (i, j) by assuming isothermal, steady-
state flow in a horizontal pipe with higher order inertial terms
omitted. Dissipative effects are aggregated using the Darcy-
Wiesbach law with resistance parameter βi j, which depends
on pipe length Li j, diameter Di j, cross-sectional area Ai j,
Colebrook-White friction factor fi j, and the wave speed a.
We assume a constant gas compressibility and temperature,
so that this speed of sound a =
√
ZRT is constant throughout
Figure 1: Nodal pressures p j, edge flows φi j, edge endpoint
variables pi j, φi j, pi j, φi j, and actuators αi j, αi j for an edge
(left) and for a joint (right).
the system. This yields
p2i j− p2i j = βi jφi j|φi j|, βi j = a2
fi jLi j
Di jA2i j
, ∀(i, j) ∈ E . (12)
III. MAXIMUM SOCIAL WELFARE OPTIMIZATION
We formulate the economic optimization problem of max-
imizing the sum of the consumer and producer surplus oth-
erwise known as social welfare, with an objective function
similar to previous studies [20], [21]. In this formulation, the
compressor stations are assumed to consume a portion of the
gas flowing through the system to obtain power. Thus, the
operating cost to the pipeline system operator is minimized
as well.
The objective function is formulated as follows. All
suppliers and offtakers are characterized by offer prices csk
and bid prices cok , respectively, specified for each gNode
k ∈ G . Some gNodes are assumed to account for demand
interruptions that are represented by supplies offered at
sufficiently high price. Including such supplies helps to
assure the feasibility of the optimization problem. We denote
the price of electricity delivered to the gas network node
i ∈ V by λei , so the price components Cei j and C
e
i j of
electric compression at either end of a pipe (i, j) ∈ E can
be expressed as
Cei j = λ
e
i (1− εi j)E i j, Cei j = λej(1− εi j)E i j. (13)
The maximum social welfare objective function is therefore
JMSW , ∑
k∈G
cokdk− ∑
k∈G
csksk
− ∑
(i, j)∈E
(λei (1− εi j)E i j +λej(1− εi j)E i j) (14)
In addition to the equality constraints defined by equa-
tions (5)-(12), engineering considerations require several
inequality constraints. Appropriate pressure limits must be
adhered to for two reasons. Upper bounds are associated
with engineering limitations called the maximum allowable
operating pressure (MAOP), which depend on each pipe,
pi j ≤ pmaxi j , pi j ≤ pmaxi j , ∀(i, j) ∈ E . (15)
Lower bounds are associated with contractual obligations to
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max Social Welfare: JMSW , ∑
k∈G
cokdk− ∑
k∈G
csksk
− ∑
j∈V
∑
i∈∂+ j
λej(1− εi j)ηi j|φi j|
(
(α2mi j )−1
)− ∑
j∈V
∑
k∈∂− j
λej(1− ε jk)η jk|φ jk|
(
(α2mjk )−1
)
(21a)
s.t. Flow balance: ∑
k∈∂− j
φ jk− ∑
i∈∂+ j
φi j = ∑
k∈∂g j
(sk−dk)
− ∑
i∈∂+ j
εi jηi j|φi j|
(
(α2mi j )−1
)− ∑
k∈∂− j
ε jkη jk|φ jk|
(
(α2mjk )−1
)
, ∀ j ∈ V , λ j (21b)
Pressure balance: (αi j pi)
2− (αi j p j)2 = βi jφi j|φi j|, ∀(i, j) ∈ E , µi j (21c)
Pressure limits: αi j pi ≤ pmaxi j , αi j p j ≤ pmaxi j , ∀(i, j) ∈ E , ξmaxi j ,ξ
max
i j (21d)
pminj ≤ p j, ∀ j ∈ V , ξminj (21e)
Boost upper limits: ηi j|φi j|
(
(α2mi j )−1
)≤ Emaxi j , ηi j|φi j|((α2mi j )−1)≤ Emaxi j ∀(i, j) ∈ E , γi j,γi j (21f)
Boost lower limits: αi j,αi j ≥ 1 ∀(i, j) ∈ E , θi j,θi j (21g)
Supply limits: smink ≤ sk ≤ smaxk ∀k ∈ G , σmink ,σmaxk (21h)
Demand limits: dmink ≤ dk ≤ dmaxk ∀k ∈ G , ζmink ,ζmaxk (21i)
L = ∑
k∈G
(csksk− cokdk)+ ∑
j∈V
∑
i∈∂+ j
λej(1− εi j)ηi j|φi j|
(
(α2mi j )−1
)
+ ∑
j∈V
∑
k∈∂− j
λej(1− ε jk)η jk|φ jk|
(
(α2mjk )−1
)
+ ∑
(i, j)∈E
µi j
(
(αi j pi)
2− (αi j p j)2−βi jφi j|φi j|
)
+ ∑
j∈V
λ j
 ∑
k∈∂− j
φ jk− ∑
i∈∂+ j
φi j− ∑
k∈∂g j
(sk−dk)

+ ∑
j∈V
λ j
(
∑
i∈∂+ j
εi jηi j|φi j|
(
(α2mi j )−1
)
+ ∑
k∈∂− j
ε jkη jk|φ jk|
(
(α2mjk )−1
))
+ ∑
j∈V
ξminj (p
min
j − p j)
+ ∑
(i, j)∈E
(
ξmax
i j
(αi j pi− pmaxi j )+ξ
max
i j (αi j p j− pmaxi j )
)
+ ∑
(i, j)∈E
(
θi j(1−αi j)+θi j(1−αi j)
)
+ ∑
(i, j)∈E
(
γ
i j
(ηi j|φi j|
(
(α2mi j )−1
)−Emaxi j )+ γi j(ηi j|φi j|((α2mi j )−1)−Emaxi j ))
+ ∑
k∈G
(
σmink (s
min
k − sk)+σmaxk (sk− smaxk )+ζmink (dmink −dk)+ζmaxk (dk−dmaxk )
)
(22)
maintain minimum pressures so that customers at each node
can withdraw gas from the line, and are given by
p j ≥ pminj , ∀ j ∈ V . (16)
Another key engineering limitation is the maximum power
of compressors used to actuate flow through the system.
Therefore, upper limits on E i j and E i j are given by
E i j ≤ Emaxi j , E i j ≤ Emaxi j , ∀(i, j) ∈ E . (17)
We have assumed that compressor stations are designed and
operated only to boost pressure, so that
αi j ≥ 1, αi j ≥ 1, ∀(i, j) ∈ E . (18)
Supplier limitations and offtaker capacities at each gNode
are subject to minimum and maximum constraints
smink ≤ sk ≤ smaxk , dmink ≤ dk ≤ dmaxk , ∀k ∈ G . (19)
With the above collection of engineering and physical con-
straints, the maximum social welfare problem is
max JMSW ,max social welfare objective (14)
s.t. nodal flow balance (5)
compressor boost conditions (6)− (7)
compressor energy (8)− (9)
compressor flow consumption (10)− (11)
pipe physical flow (12)
pressure limits (15)− (16)
compressor limits (17)− (18)
supply and demand limits (19)
(20)
We make several substitutions in problem (20) to create
a new, simpler problem (21). We substitute for φ
i j
and φi j
using equations (10)-(11), and for pi j and pi j using equations
(6)-(7). We may approximate φ
i j
and φi j by φi j in constraints
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sk : 0 = csk−λ j(k)+σmaxk −σmink ∀ j ∈ V (23a)
dk : 0 =−cok +λ j(k)+ζmaxk −ζmink ∀ j ∈ V (23b)
p j : 0 = ∑
i∈∂+ j
(−2µi jα2i j p j +ξ
max
i j αi j)+ ∑
k∈∂− j
(2µ jkα2jk p j +ξ
max
jk
α jk)−ξminj ∀ j ∈ V (23c)
φi j : 0 = (λi−λ j)−2βi jµi j|φi j|+(γi j + εi jλ j +λej(1− εi j))ηi j
(
(α2mi j )−1
)
sign(φi j)
+(γ
i j
+ εi jλi +λ
e
i (1− εi j))ηi j
(
(α2mi j )−1
)
sign(φi j) ∀(i, j) ∈ E (23d)
αi j : 0 = 2αi jµi j p
2
i +2m(γi j + εi jλi +(1− εi j)λ
e
i )ηi j|φi j|α2m−1i j + piξ
max
i j
−θi j ∀(i, j) ∈ E (23e)
αi j : 0 =−2αi jµi j p2j +2m(γi j + εi jλ j +λej(1− εi j))ηi j|φi j|α2m−1i j + p jξ
max
i j −θi j = 0 ∀(i, j) ∈ E (23f)
(8)-(9), because compressor flow consumptions E i j and E i j
are small compared to flow φi j. We then substitute for E i j
and E i j using these modified constraints. This yields the
formulation given as problem (21), where the appropriate
Lagrange multiplier is denoted to the right of each constraint.
In the problem (21), only nodal pressures p j for j∈V and
edge flows φi j for (i, j) ∈E appear, instead of the boundary
variables that are used in the formulation (20). Note that in
the solution, only one of the compressors attached at the
boundaries of a pipe can be working. Although this can be
shown using an economic argument, it is an engineering
requirement, because gas cannot flow from discharge to
suction through a working compressor. The Lagrangian
for the problem is given in equation (22). Because our
objective is a maximization, we reverse the sign of the
objective function in the Lagrangian. The Karush-Kuhn
Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions are obtained by taking
partial derivatives of L with respect to the optimization
variables and setting to zero [26]. These KKT conditions are
given in equations (23) for the variables (denoted at left).
Complementary slackness also requires the conditions
ξmax
i j
(αi j pi− pmaxi j ) = 0, ∀(i, j) ∈ E (24a)
ξ
max
i j (αi j p j− pmaxi j ) = 0, ∀(i, j) ∈ E (24b)
ξminj (p
min
j − p j) = 0, ∀ j ∈ V (24c)
γ
i j
(ηi j|φi j|
(
(α2mi j )−1
)−Emaxi j ) = 0, ∀(i, j) ∈ E (24d)
γi j(ηi j|φi j|
(
(α2mi j )−1
)−Emaxi j ) = 0, ∀(i, j) ∈ E (24e)
θi j(1−αi j) = 0, θi j(1−αi j) = 0, ∀(i, j) ∈ E (24f)
σmink (s
min
k − sk) = 0, ∀k ∈ G (24g)
σmaxk (sk− smaxk ) = 0, ∀k ∈ G (24h)
ζmink (d
min
k −dk) = 0, ∀k ∈ G (24i)
ζmaxk (dk−dmaxk ) = 0. ∀k ∈ G (24j)
Furthermore, note that inequality constraints have been writ-
ten in the form g(x)≤ 0, so that dual feasibility requires that
the multipliers on these constraints are positive, i.e.,
ξminj , ξ
max
i j
, ξ
max
i j , ζ
min
i j , ζ
max
i j , σ
min
i j , σ
max
i j ≥ 0, (25)
γ
i j
, γi j, θi j, θi j ≥ 0. (26)
IV. ANALYSIS OF LOCATIONAL PRICES
By definition, shadow prices for the nodal balance con-
straint reflect the change in the objective function (social
welfare) in response to the infinitesimal increase in nat-
ural gas consumption at location j, and can therefore be
interpreted as locational marginal prices of natural gas (or
gLMPs). It is important to note that the necessary KKT
conditions on which we rely in this analysis do not by
themselves guarantee that shadow prices will be equal to
the Lagrange multipliers λ j specified in KKT conditions.
A proof that shadow prices are equivalent to Lagrange
multipliers makes the latter economically meaningful, and
is required to justify an interpretation of the Lagrange
multipliers λ j as gLMPs.
Such a proof usually follows a two-step process: 1)
establishing the equivalence between finding an optimum
solution in a constraint optimization problem and finding a
saddle-point of that problem’s Lagrangian; and 2) proving
differentiability (or more precisely absolute continuity) of
the value of the Lagrangian as a function of the constraint
limit. The second part of the proof relies on the envelope
theorem [27]. It is important to note that this two-step
process does not require a convexity assumption. In fact,
differentiability of the objective function and functions that
define constraints in the neighborhood of the optimum are
sufficient to claim that the optimal value of the objective
function is an absolutely continuous function of the con-
straint limit, and to equate the shadow price to a Lagrange
multiplier. Indeed, the envelope theorem for saddle-point
problems (Theorem 4 in [27]) requires no convexity and
holds under the assumption that the Lagrangian is an ab-
solutely continuous function of primal and dual variables.
This holds in the present case. Furthermore, demonstrating
equivalence between a constraint optimization problem and
a saddle-point problem for the Lagrangian does not require
a convexity assumption. For example, differentiability of the
optimization problem in the neighborhood of the optimum is
sufficient to demonstrate such equivalence (see Saddle Point
Theorem on p. 76 of [28]). So, although the optimization
problem above is non-convex, it is justifiable to interpret
the values of λ j as gLMPs.
In the following, we proceed to analyze the Lagrange
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multipliers to explore mathematical relationships between
gLMPs and other characteristics of the system, and to pro-
vide economic interpretation of these relationships. First, we
establish the relationship between gLMPs, supply offers, and
offtaker bids. These basic relationships that follow directly
from (23a)-(23b) can be expressed as
λ j(k) = csk +σ
max
k −σmink , (27a)
λ j(k) = cok−ζmaxk +ζmink . (27b)
We can then classify suppliers and offtakers according to
the relation between their offers/bids and the nodal gLMP.
Marginal Supplier: λ j(k) = csk,
σmaxk = σ
min
k = 0, s
min
k < sk < s
max
k . (28a)
Supra-Marginal Supplier: λ j(k) < csk,
σmaxk = 0, σ
min
k = c
s
k−λ j(k), sk = smink . (28b)
Infra-Marginal Supplier: λ j(k) > csk,
σmink = 0, σ
max
k = λ j(k)− csk, sk = smaxk . (28c)
Marginal Offtaker: λ j(k) = cok ,
ζmaxk = ζ
min
k = 0, d
min
k < dk < d
max
k . (29a)
Supra-Marginal Offtaker: λ j(k) < cok ,
ζmink = 0, ζ
max
k = c
o
k−λ j(k), dk = dmaxk . (29b)
Infra-Marginal Offtaker: λ j(k) > cok ,
ζmaxk = 0, ζ
min
k = λ j(k)− cok , dk = dmink . (29c)
Offers of infra-marginal suppliers and bids of supra-marginal
offtakers are taken at maximum level because infra-marginal
supply is offered below cleared price and a supra-marginal
offtaker is willing to buy above the cleared prices. In con-
trast, offers of supra-marginal suppliers and infra-marginal
off-takes are taken at the minimum level, because such
supplies are offered above cleared prices and offtakers’
willingness to pay is below clearing price.
Next we explore equations (23d) - (23f). Here we make
an assumption (which could be confirmed by a formal proof)
that in an optimal solution of problem (21), the compression
in any given pipe is only applied at the sending end and
never at the receiving end, where sending and receiving are
defined according to the actual direction of the flow. Thus,
if φi j > 0, then αi j = 1 and if φi j < 0, then αi j = 1. With
this assumption we restate (23d) - (23f) for the case φi j > 0.
λ j−λi = (γi j + εi jλi +λ
e
i (1− εi j))ηi j
(
(α2mi j )−1
)
−2βi jµi jφi j (30)
2αi jµi j p
2
i =−2m(γi j + εi jλi +(1− εi j)λ
e
i )ηi jφi jα
2m−1
i j
− piξmaxi j +θi j (31)
2µi j p2j = 2m(εi jλ j +λ
e
j(1− εi j))ηi jφi j + p jξ
max
i j −θi j (32)
Solving equation (31) for µi j and substituting this into
(30) yields an expression for the basis differential (price
difference) between two neighboring nodes given by
λ j−λi = δi j +∆ci j +∆pi j (33)
where δi j is the compression component of the basis differ-
ential, which is equal to the product of the purchase price
of energy and marginal energy consumed by the compressor
to deliver an incremental unit of gas along the pipe (i, j). In
addition, the basis differential may include two congestion
components, denoted by ∆ci j and ∆
p
i j, which are associated
with a compressor constrained at its maximum capacity and
discharge pressure constrained at the MAOP of the pipe,
respectively. These components are given by
δi j = (εi jλi +λ
e
i (1− εi j))Mi j−θi j
βi jφi j
αi j p2i
, (34)
∆ci j = γi jMi j, (35)
∆pi j = ξ
max
i j
βi jφi j
αi j pi
, (36)
Mi j = ηi j(α
2m
i j −1)+2mηi jα2mi j
βi jφ2i j
(αi j pi)2
, (37)
where Mi j is the energy used by compressor to move
marginal volume of gas along the pipe. If the compressor
operates, then αi j > 1 and θi j = 0, hence the compression
component is strictly positive. Furthermore, in this case the
relationship between the flow and compression given by the
pressure balance equation (21c) is
α2i j =
βi jφ2i j + p2j
p2i
. (38)
It is straightforward to demonstrate that the compression
component δi j is monotonically increasing with the gas flow.
Two congestion components in equation (33) correspond
to two possible conditions that may lead to congestion.
Specifically, congestion occurs when the compressor oper-
ates at its capacity limit, resulting in γ
i j
> 0, or when the
pressure reaches its upper limit, resulting in ξmax
i j
> 0. In all
cases, the congestion component is non-negative. Thus, if
the compression is applied, the basis differential in equation
(33) is strictly positive, which indicates that the gas would
flow from the lower price node to the higher price node.
In the absence of compression, the compression component
gains a negative term of the form
−θi j
βi jφi j
αi j p2i
. (39)
However, we can demonstrate that in this case, the basis
differential will also be non-negative. A proof can be con-
structed as follows. Observe that for the Lagrangian (22) to
reach its minimum at the optimal solution, it is necessary
that its second derivative with respect to any line flow must
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be non-negative. That second derivative equals
∂2L
∂φ2i j
=−µi jsign(φi j), (40)
and therefore, whenever the flow is positive, i.e., φi j > 0, the
corresponding dual value must be non-positive, i.e., µi j ≤ 0,
and vise-versa. Observe that when αi j = 1, the optimality
condition (23e) results in
2µi j p2i =−2m(εi jλi +(1− εi j)λei )ηi jφi j− piξ
max
i j
+θi j, (41)
which, because −µi j ≤ 0, yields
θi j ≤ 2m(εi jλi +(1− εi j)λei )ηi jφi j + piξ
max
i j
(42)
Substituting this into the expression for the basis differential
equation (33) when αi j = 1, and therefore γi j = 0, yields
λ j−λi = 2mηi j(εi jλi +λei (1− εi j))
βi jφ2i j
p2i
−θi j
βi jφi j
p2i
+ξmax
i j
βi jφi j
pi
=
βi jφi j
p2i
(
2mηi j(εi jλi+λ
e
i (1− εi j))φi j+ξmaxi j pi−θi j
)
≥ 0 (43)
Note that the above discussion was applied to the case of
positive flow, i.e. φi j > 0. Using a similar approach, it can
be shown that when φi j < 0, the basis differential is
−(λ j−λi) = δi j +∆ci j +∆pi j (44)
where δi j, ∆
c
i j, and ∆
p
i j are the components related to
compression, capacity congestion, and pressure congestion.
These components are given by
δi j = (εi jλi +λei (1− εi j))Mi j−θi j
βi jφi j
αi j p2j
, (45)
∆ci j = γi jMi j, (46)
∆pi j = ξ
max
i j
βi jφi j
αi j p j
, (47)
Mi j = ηi j(α
2m
i j −1)+2mηi jα2mi j
βi jφ2i j
(αi j p j)2
, (48)
In the following section, we apply the results of this analysis
to establish revenue adequacy of the pricing mechanism.
V. REVENUE ADEQUACY
Revenue adequacy is an important requirement for the
price formation mechanism to assure that off-takers’ pay-
ments collected by the market administrator are sufficient to
cover suppliers’ receipts as well as transportation costs that
include gas compressor operation. The cash balance retained
by the market administrator is set by
R = ∑
k∈G
λ j(k)(dk− sk)
− ∑
j∈V
∑
i∈∂+ j
λej(1− εi j)ηi j|φi j|
(
(α2mi j )−1
)
− ∑
j∈V
∑
k∈∂− j
λej(1− ε jk)η jk|φ jk|
(
(α2mjk )−1
)
(49)
Because we consider a single price auction mechanism, all
offtakers connected to the same node pay the same price
and all suppliers connected to the same node receive the
same price. The first term in the equation above represents
the difference between off-takers’ payments and suppliers’
receipts, and the second two terms represent payments for
electric energy used by electrically powered compressors.
As noted previously, compression can occur only at one end
of any given pipe. Using the flow balance equation, the cash
balance formula can be written
R = ∑
j∈V
∑
i∈∂+ j
λ jφi j− ∑
j∈V
∑
k∈∂− j
λ jφ jk−Ccomp, (50)
where Ccomp denotes the total cost of compression. Note that
in the first line of the above expression every edge appears
twice, once with a plus sign and the price at the receiving
node, and once with a negative sign and the price at the
sending node. Thus the revenue can be written as
R = ∑
(i, j)∈E
(λ j−λi)φi j−Ccomp. (51)
The total cost of compression Ccomp is given by
Ccomp = ∑
j∈V
∑
i∈∂+ j
λ jεi jηi j|φi j|
(
(α2mi j )−1
)
+ ∑
j∈V
∑
k∈∂− j
λ jε jkη jk|φ jk|
(
(α2mjk )−1
)
+ ∑
j∈V
∑
i∈∂+ j
λej(1− εi j)ηi j|φi j|
(
(α2mi j )−1
)
+ ∑
j∈V
∑
k∈∂− j
λej(1− ε jk)η jk|φ jk|
(
(α2mjk )−1
)
. (52)
By substituting the basis differential formulas (33) and
(44) into equation (51), we can see that all compression
cost terms cancel out and the resulting cash balance is
given by (53). As demonstrated before for each branch, if
the compression in the branch is active, the contribution of
R = ∑
(i, j)∈E :
φi j≥0
βi jφ2i j
(αi j pi)2
(
2mηi j(α
2m−1
i j (εi jλi +λ
e
i (1− εi j))−θi j
)
+ ∑
(i, j)∈E :
φi j<0
βi jφ2i j
(αi j p j)2
(
2mηi j(α
2m−1
i j (εi jλ j +λ
e
j(1− εi j))−θi j
)
+ ∑
(i, j)∈E :φi j≥0
γ
i j
Mi j + ∑
(i, j)∈E :φi j<0
γi jMi j + ∑
(i, j)∈E :φi j≥0
ξmax
i j
βi jφi j
αi j pi
− ∑
(i, j)∈E :φi j<0
ξ
max
i j
βi jφi j
αi j p j
(53)
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Figure 2: Simple 4-node example network.
that branch to the cash balance is strictly positive. In the
absence of the compression, the contribution of the branch
to the cash balance is non-negative. This proves the revenue
adequacy of the locational pricing mechanism. As noted
earlier, gas compressor operation costs may include the costs
of gas or electricity used to drive the units. These costs are
accounted for in (49) through payments to gas suppliers in
the case of gas-powered compressors, and included explicitly
for electrically powered compressors.
VI. COMPUTATIONAL EXAMPLES
Consider first a computational study on a simple pipeline
system that connects a single supplier with three offtakers,
as illustrated in Figure 2. There are two compressors that
are used to propel gas, and the system has a total length
of 290 miles. The system parameters are specified in Table
I using standard units. The gas equation of state used is
the ideal gas law with wave speed a = 1240 ft/s. We ignore
compression energy in this example for now in order to focus
purely on congestion pricing. This can be done by setting
the burn rate parameters η to zero in equations (21a) and
(21b), while keeping a positive value of η in equation (21f).
The optimization problem (21) for this case study has 12
variables, and requires less than a second to solve using an
interior point method on a commodity computer [29].
Table I: Model 4 Parameter Data.
Node Parameter Data
Node pminj p
max
j d
min
j d
max
j s
min
j s
max
j $/mmscfd
id # psia mmscfd offer bid
1 600 1000 0 0 400 2000 $1 -
2 300 1000 0 800 0 0 - $2
3 300 1000 0 600 0 0 - $4
4 300 1000 0 2000 0 0 - $3
Pipe Parameter Data
Pipe From node To node Di j Li j fi j
id # i j inches miles
1 1 2 36 50 0.01
2 2 3 36 80 0.01
3 2 4 36 80 0.01
4 3 4 25 80 0.01
Compressor Parameter Data
Compressor Location node To edge Emaxi j
id # node id # edge id # horsepower
1 1 1 6000
2 2 3 4000
The results of the optimization case study are shown in
Table II. Examining the marginal prices λ j, we see that
the price at node 2 is lowest, while the price at node 3
is highest, and node 4 is the marginal offtaker. We find
that the price downstream of node 2 is high enough for no
deliveries to be made there for this particular parameter set.
Indeed, capacity is maximally utilized, because the discharge
pressure of compressor 1 is set to the MAOP of 1000 psia.
This is the binding constraint related to compressor 1. Next,
observe that compressor 2 is operating at its horsepower
bound. Finally, the pressure at node 3 is at the minimum,
because the offtake at that location is maximized.
Because the compression costs were omitted in the op-
timization, and the compression ratios satisfy αi j > 1, the
compression component δi j will not appear in the basis
differential equation (33). However, it is a straightforward
exercise to verify the congestion components corresponding
to compressor power and pressure limits given by ∆ci j and
∆pi j. Further investigation of even this simple example can
provide insight into the interaction of physical, economic,
and engineering aspects of gas pipeline systems.
Table II: Model 4 Solution Data.
Node Solution Data
Node Consumption d j Supply s j Marginal Price λ j
id # mmscfd $/mmscfd
1 - 1475.9 -
2 0 - 2.6481
3 600 - 3.1650
4 875.89 - 3.0000
Pipe Solution Data
Pipe From node To node pi j pi j φi j
id # i j psia mmscfd
1 1 2 1000 474.41 1475.9
2 2 3 474.41 300 487.12
3 2 4 831.51 367.30 988.76
4 3 4 300 367.30 -112.87
Compressor Solution Data
Compressor Location node To edge αi j E i j
id # node id i edge id # ratio horsepower
1 1 1 1.666 5256.4
2 2 3 1.7527 4000.0
To demonstrate scalability, we formed a case study using
the Gaslib-40 network instance [30]. This system has 40
nodes, 45 pipes, and a total system length of 695 miles,
with supply at nodes 1, 2, and 3, where we set offer prices
(per mmscfd) to $1, $1.5, and $2, respectively. We set bids
at $3 per mmscfd at most offtaker locations, and set bids
of $4 at nodes 22, 24, 25, and 34, and bids of $8 at nodes
16, 18, 20, and 31. Maximum offtakes for any consumer
were set to 800 mmscfd, and this constraint was binding
at nodes 16, 18, 22, and 39, while nodes 6, 20, 26, 31, 34,
and 36 had lesser nonzero offtakes. Maximum power for the
compressors on edges 43 and 44 were limited to 3000 and
2000 horsepower, respectively, and were binding. Minimum
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Figure 3: Solution for Gaslib-40 example. From left to right: System diagram; Supplier offers and offtaker bids; Pressure
solution; Marginal price solution. High offers and capacity constraints drive price formation.
and maximum system pressures were set to 500 and 800
psi, respectively. The problem, which has 125 variables, is
solved using an interior point method [29] in about 0.85
seconds. Figure 3 illustrates the results.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We have presented a locational marginal pricing mecha-
nism to maximize social welfare for a gas pipeline network
with steady-state flow. Optimality conditions are derived
that lead to locational marginal prices for gas (gLMPs) that
account for physical and engineering system constraints.
These gLMPs provide price signals that quantify the cost
of physical transportation of gas through the system. The
pricing system is shown to be revenue adequate. A simple,
interpretable computational example was explored, and a
larger and more complex example was examined to demon-
strate scalability of the approach to real systems.
Our focus here is on developing an economic theory of
optimal pipeline network operation that can lead to methods
for optimal day-ahead and intra-day flow scheduling. At
these time scales, we assume that the economics of natural
gas production and supply are embedded in the offer prices
of consumers and suppliers. This preliminary study does
not consider co-optimization of pipeline transportation and
storage operations, but rather assume that the economic
aspects of storage injections and withdrawals are reflected
in corresponding price offers and bids.
The key theoretical instrument used in this paper is
the analysis of Karush Kuhn Tucker (KKT) conditions for
optimality. The steady-state pipeline optimization problem
examined is non-convex, so the KKT conditions are not
sufficient to prove optimality or construct solutions, nor
are they used here for those purposes. Computational ap-
proaches have been shown to effectively solve large-scale
pipeline optimization problems [23], [24]. The primary focus
of this paper is rather on the introduction and derivation of
properties of gLMPs. As necessary conditions of optimality,
the KKT conditions provide a powerful instrument for
studying the properties of Lagrange multipliers as those
properties must necessarily hold at the optimal solution
of the problem. In general, that part of the KKT theorem
does not require convexity of the optimization problems.
On the other hand, the KKT theorem does not by itself
assert that these Lagrange multipliers could be interpreted
as shadow prices for the associated constraints. The use in
economic theory of certain Lagrange multipliers as prices
of goods or services requires justification. The latter is
typically provided by envelope theorems that address the
differentiability properties of the objective function of a
parameterized optimization problem [31]. Crucially, the key
results of the envelope theorem do not require convexity and
remain true under significantly less stringent assumptions.
This has been discussed in Section IV above.
The above steady-state modeling approach is valid for
coarse price formation over large-scale systems on time
scales of weeks. Appropriate engineering models must be
used for such economic optimization problems to suitably
represent physical flows on the relevant time and space
scales. Recently, regulatory changes in the United States
have opened the path to physics-based gas pricing mech-
anisms with intra-day time granularity [10], [11], which
compels further investigation [9]. This work is a step towards
developing the theory and computation of dynamic price
formation for intra-day flows. Extension to multi-period
economic optimization that incorporates transient hydraulic
models [32], [23], sensitivity analysis for larger case studies,
and global optimization by adaptive partitioning mixed-
integer relaxations [33] are promising future directions.
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